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ABSTRACT—The rough equivalence of certification and ultimate outcome
is class action dogma. If certification is granted, then the plaintiff “wins”
by settlement because the risk of incurring class-wide liability by going to
trial is too great. If certification is denied, the defendant “wins” because the
case may not be worth litigating without the possibility of a class-wide
recovery. This Note is about where the dogma is wrong. There are now
cases where a denial of certification, just like a grant, presents to the
defendant the risk of incurring class-wide liability at trial. This is because
those cases are capable of what I call jury certification. Thanks to recent
case law, there are now cases where the jury will decide an issue when it
passes on the merits that is the same issue that the judge first decided
during certification. The merits and class certification overlap on that issue.
That overlap gives the jury’s verdict the power to, in effect, overrule the
judge’s decision to deny certification. Thus, a defendant facing a certified
class and a defendant facing an uncertified class capable of jury
certification are in the same bargaining position—going to trial means
risking class-wide liability. Here, I will explain how jury certification could
work in federal securities class actions, where the conditions for jury
certification are often found.
AUTHOR—J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2013; B.A.,
Pomona College, 2007. Special thanks to Professor Martin H. Redish and
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INTRODUCTION
Class certification decides federal securities fraud class actions.1 With
few exceptions, certified classes settle and classes denied certification are
abandoned.2 And within a subset of securities class actions, those alleging
misstatement-based securities fraud in violation of Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 10b-5, certification often turns on just one of its
requirements: predominance.3 Securities fraud class actions can only be
certified if common questions of fact or law “predominate,” that is, if the
questions common to a class’s claims outweigh individual questions.4
Normally, fraud cases cannot be certified because reliance—did the
plaintiff reasonably rely on the defendant’s misstatement—is a
quintessentially individual question.5
So, typically, reliance destroys predominance.6 But in securities fraud,
reliance can sometimes be presumed,7 and since the presumption applies to
1

By “federal securities fraud class action,” I mean a securities fraud class action brought under
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012)) and
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)).
2
See, e.g., DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 429 (3d ed.
2011) (“The court’s decision on certification carries enormous significance for all concerned. If
certification is denied, most (and possibly all) members of the might-have-been class will lose the
opportunity to recover because they lack the resources to sue individually. On the other hand, a grant of
certification may so increase the defendant’s potential damages liability and litigation costs that he may
find it economically prudent to settle and to abandon a meritorious defense.” (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
3
See e.g., Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., No. Civ.A. 301CV0166N, 2004 WL 1490009, at *5
(N.D. Tex. July 1, 2004) (denying class certification solely based on predominance).
4
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
5
See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242, 243–44 (1988) (plurality opinion) (“Requiring
proof of individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would
have prevented respondents from proceeding with a class action, since individual issues then would
have overwhelmed the common ones.”).
6
See id.
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the entire class, common questions predominate.8 Thus, certification in
securities fraud class actions involving misstatements often comes down to
whether a presumption—called the fraud-on-the-market presumption9—
applies. If it does, predominance is satisfied, and these securities fraud
class actions tend to easily satisfy the other class certification
requirements.10 Whether the presumption applies, in turn, depends on
whether the security involved in the alleged fraud traded on a so-called
“efficient market.”11
In sum: if the market was efficient, the presumption applies; if the
presumption applies, predominance is satisfied; if predominance is
satisfied, the class is certified; and, if the class is certified, the plaintiff, in
effect, wins. It all comes down to the judge’s market-efficiency finding on
class certification. So it has been and so it is today.
In this Note, I try to upset that paradigm. I believe that defendants may
now want to settle—with the entire class—even if the judge finds the
relevant market inefficient and therefore denies certification. The reason
boils down to what I call jury certification. The reason defendants settle
when classes are certified is because going forward with the case means
risking class-wide liability at trial.12 Jury certification creates this same risk
in cases where the judge denies certification.
How? Jury certification is shorthand for a series of procedural steps a
plaintiff can take to, in effect, reverse the judge’s initial denial of
certification after a jury trial but before final judgment is entered. Thus, a
defendant facing a freshly certified class stands in the same position as a
defendant facing an individual plaintiff who has just been denied
certification but has jury certification available. Both defendants must
choose between settling now or risking class-wide liability at trial.

7

See id. at 247 (discussing presumption); see also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 152–54 (1972) (approving presumption based on material omissions).
8
Basic, 485 U.S. at 242 (plurality opinion).
9
In sum, the fraud-on-the-market presumption is based on the economic theory that, in an efficient
market, all public information is incorporated into the price of a security. Thus, anyone who bought at
the market price relied on all the public statements made about the security. See id. at 245–47 (plurality
opinion); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1982).
10
See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of Class
Certification Merits Trials in Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 325–26 (2010)
(“The dispositive issues [on class certification] for securities class actions are often whether common
issues of loss causation or reliance predominate.”).
11
See In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 42–43 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding the
presumption did not apply as the plaintiffs failed to prove an efficient market); Gariety v. Grant
Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 364 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting four requirements for the presumption to
apply, including that the shares traded on an efficient market).
12
See, e.g., William Simon, Class Actions—Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375,
380 (1973) (“[C]ertification of a broad class often determines the entire case by coercing the defendants
to settle even unmeritorious claims.”).
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Admittedly, jury certification only works in some cases. The judge
must have denied certification solely based on a lack of predominance, and
specifically a lack of predominance based on a finding of market
inefficiency. Other than predominance, all the other certification
requirements must have been found to be met.13 Many, many, securities
class actions satisfy this condition.14 Assuming the condition is met, there
are three paths to jury certification. All three paths begin with the
individual plaintiff, who has just been denied class certification, proceeding
to and winning a jury trial. This is counter to the usual practice. Usually,
plaintiffs abandon their case if denied certification (with an exception being
plaintiffs with massive individual damages, like institutional investors).15
But jury certification requires plaintiffs to press on and win. At the moment
the jury finds the defendant liable for securities fraud, the three paths
diverge.
First, a post-verdict plaintiff can immediately ask the judge to amend
the order denying certification with a motion under Rule 23(c).16 When it
found liability, the jury, in effect, disagreed with the judge’s earlier finding
on market efficiency; it had to or it could not have found the defendant
liable. Market efficiency is both a certification requirement, in that it is
necessary to satisfy predominance, and an element of the plaintiff’s cause
of action, in that it is necessary to prove reliance.17 Moreover, the jury is
free to disagree with the judge, since the judge’s class certification finding
is not binding on the jury.18 By filing the Rule 23(c) motion, the plaintiff is
asking the judge to substitute the jury’s finding for her own. Under the
jury’s view, the market was efficient, and therefore, common questions
could predominate. And since the individual plaintiff was a member of the
13

A putative class must meet all four Rule 23(a) requirements and the requirements of at least one
of the four types of class actions laid out in Rule 23(b) for certification. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
14
Relatively recent examples of large securities class actions that fit this bill include: In re
PolyMedica Corp. Securities Litigation, 432 F.3d 1, 3 n.4 (1st Cir. 2005); Bell v. Ascendant Solutions,
Inc., No. Civ.A. 301CV0166N, 2004 WL 1490009, at *4–5 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2004); Krogman v.
Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 471–73 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
15
See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469–70 (1978) (“[W]ithout the incentive of a
possible group recovery the individual plaintiff may find it economically imprudent to pursue his
lawsuit to a final judgment . . . .”); see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial
Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 904–
06 (1987) (breaking class actions into three categories based on marketability of individual claims).
16
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C).
17
See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011) (“It is undisputed
that securities fraud plaintiffs must prove certain things in order to invoke Basic’s rebuttable
presumption of reliance. It is common ground, for example, that plaintiffs must demonstrate . . . that the
stock traded in an efficient market . . . .” (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27
(1988))); id. at 2184 (“Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s deceptive acts is an essential
element of the § 10(b) private cause of action.” (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlantic, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
18
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 n.6 (2011) (“[The overlapped issue is]
an issue they will surely have to prove again at trial in order to make out their case on the merits.”).
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class, her claim is identical to those of the class; the liability finding on
behalf of the individual plaintiff applies to the whole class. By winning her
own case, the plaintiff has won the same trial the class would have won.
Rule 23(c) can turn an individual plaintiff’s win into a win for the class.
But judges have a great deal of discretion on Rule 23(c) motions.19 If
the motion is denied, path number two provides a “Plan B.” To follow the
second path to jury certification, the plaintiff allows the case to terminate in
a final, individual judgment. Then, with another member of the class as
plaintiff, a second, identical class action is filed. When the time comes for
the class certification motion, the judgment in the first case sets up
collateral estoppel, preventing the defendant from arguing that the market
was inefficient.20 In the usual securities fraud case, certification turns on
market efficiency because the other certification requirements are easily
met, as they were in the first case. Thus, with the prior judgment in hand,
the second plaintiff should easily obtain class certification and, shortly
thereafter, a class-wide settlement.
The third path is a variation on the second. Like the second, this path
involves two cases. But, unlike the second, for the third path, only the
second case is a class action. It is not necessary that the first case be filed as
or attempt to gain certification as a class action. Collateral estoppel can set
up class certification in the second case so long as the first case’s plaintiff
has the same claim as the plaintiff class.21
Admittedly, all paths to jury certification are long and uncertain. They
require judges to make decisions for which they have considerable
discretion.22 A judge who believes that the Rule 23(c) motion or collateral
estoppel involves substantial unfairness to the defendant is well within her
rights to refuse either.23 But, for two reasons, this does not make jury
certification any less viable. First, forewarned is forearmed. To avoid a
claim of prejudice, the plaintiff need only put the defendant on notice of
her plans.24 If the defendant has been warned that jury certification is
contemplated, then it is the defendant’s own fault for not taking the
19

7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
PROCEDURE § 1785.4 (3d ed. 2005) (“However, it must be noted that there is no requirement that
the court alter its class-action order when the circumstances surrounding its initial determination
change. The decision to amend a class-certification order is discretionary.”).
20
See generally Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326–33 (1979) (describing use
of collateral estoppel in a securities case).
21
See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
22
See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19; Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331 (“We have concluded that
the preferable approach for dealing with these problems in the federal courts is not to preclude the use
of offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should be
applied.”).
23
See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19; Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331.
24
See Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 877–78 (11th Cir. 1986) (permitting a posttrial expansion of the class because notice deprived the defendant of a claim of prejudice).
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individual plaintiff’s case seriously. Second, jury certification does not
need to be a sure thing to “work.” Rather, it works if the defendant settles,
and the defendant will settle based on its evaluation of the risk that the
plaintiff will succeed. Defendants who are unwilling to brave that risk will
settle.
And those settlements are significant. Currently, many securities fraud
class actions are abandoned when judges deny certification solely on
market-inefficiency grounds. Those cases are tallied in the defense win
column. Jury certification could, potentially, put some of those many cases,
involving many hundreds of millions of dollars,25 back in the plaintiff’s
column. Accordingly, jury certification is literally a multi-million dollar
proposition.
But, in spite of this, no plaintiff has yet tried it.26 This should not be
surprising. The normal practice—certify and settle; lose certification and
abandon—is longstanding. The modern securities class action has been
around since 1966.27 But only recently has the case law evolved in a way
that would allow jury certification. The key is what I call the overlap
interpretation.
The overlap interpretation is an explanation of the interaction of Rule
23’s class certification requirements and the elements of a substantive
cause of action, like securities fraud. Under the overlap interpretation, a
particular element of the plaintiff’s claim is said to overlap with a
certification requirement.28 To get certified, the plaintiff must prove the
element. If the case is certified, then the plaintiff will have to prove the
element again at trial.29 In securities fraud the overlap is on market
efficiency—it is both a merits element, because it proves reliance, and it is
also considered necessary to show predominance.30

25

See generally Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1465, 1497–98 & 1497 n.159 (2004) (providing examples of settlement amounts).
26
Proving a negative is difficult. I base this statement on a thorough survey of reported cases,
academic writing, and practitioner journals.
27
See Simon, supra note 12, at 375–76 (describing how the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 created
the modern class action).
28
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 (2011) (“In this case, proof of
commonality necessarily overlaps with respondents’ merits contention that Wal–Mart engages in a
pattern or practice of discrimination.” (first emphasis added)).
29
Id. at 2552 n.6.
30
See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011) (“It is undisputed
that securities fraud plaintiffs must prove certain things in order to invoke Basic’s rebuttable
presumption of reliance. It is common ground, for example, that plaintiffs must demonstrate . . . that the
stock traded in an efficient market . . . .” (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27 (1988)
(plurality opinion))); id. at 2184 (“Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s deceptive acts is an
essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of action.” (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlantic, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Practically speaking, the overlap interpretation does three things. First,
it makes class certification harder to obtain.31 It was not long ago that all a
securities fraud plaintiff needed to do to satisfy the predominance
requirement was plead the fraud-on-the-market theory.32 The overlap
interpretation requires them to prove its applicability by proving market
efficiency. The difference is enormous: alleging versus proving. The
second point is related to the first. Forcing plaintiffs to prove market
efficiency makes class certification more expensive.33 Class certification
motions involving the overlap interpretation now come after enormous
amounts of discovery, laden with expert opinions and exhibits.34 This cost
hits both plaintiffs and defendants, who will prepare and file their own
expert opinions to counter the plaintiff’s.
The third thing that the overlap interpretation does is what makes jury
certification possible: it gives juries a say in class certification. Thanks to
the overlap interpretation, the jury decides a certification requirement when
it decides the merits of the plaintiff’s case. Without the overlap
interpretation, jury certification would be impossible.
The remainder of this Note has three Parts. In Part I, I briefly introduce
key class action concepts, including a description of the overlap
interpretation. Part II goes, step-by-step, through jury certification and
closes by suggesting some countermeasures that defendants might employ
against it. A conclusion follows.
I.

CLASS ACTIONS, CLASS CERTIFICATION, AND THE OVERLAP
INTERPRETATION
For those unfamiliar with class action litigation, this Part will
introduce basic principles. Section A deals with the class action generally.
Section B deals with class certification, describing its requirements and its
legal and practical significance. Sections C and D describe the two recent
31

See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 10, at 330 (“This growing trend requires plaintiffs to
establish more and more of their securities fraud claims on a Rule 23 hearing.”).
32
See Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., No. 01-703, 2003 WL 25739165, at *5–6 (M.D. La. Aug. 1, 2003)
(certifying the class based on plaintiff’s allegations that market was efficient); Herbst v. Able, 47
F.R.D. 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (“Defendants argue strenuously that this case involves predominantly
individual questions of reliance, and that plaintiffs’ theory of market fraud is inapplicable to a case
involving the conversion of debt securities into equity securities. The court finds that these arguments
go to the merits of plaintiffs’ case rather than to the question of the maintenance of a class action in
accordance with the manner in which plaintiffs seek to proceed.”).
33
See Brief for Respondents at 10–11, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No.
10-277), 2011 WL 686407, at *10–11 (“After extensive discovery, including over 200 depositions,
production of more than a million pages of documents, and electronic personnel data, plaintiffs
assembled a massive record to support class certification.”).
34
See id.; see also Steig D. Olson, “Chipping Away”: The Misguided Trend Toward Resolving
Merits Disputes as Part of the Class Certification Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935, 955 (2009)
(criticizing the overlap interpretation based on cost).
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developments in class certification law that give rise to the possibility of
jury certification: the overlap interpretation and, to a lesser extent, the
preponderance standard. I note from the outset that I take no normative
stance on either the state of class certification law or the place of class
actions in litigation. I will, however, occasionally cite or discuss cases and
scholarship that do.
A. The Class Action
A class action is a representative action.35 A single person or small
group—the class representative or representatives—brings a case alleging
that they and others like them—the absent class members—have been
wronged by the defendant. Instead of bringing multiple lawsuits or all
joining in the same lawsuit, class action rules allow the representatives to
litigate on behalf of absentees, all as one class, and without the absentees’
involvement or, sometimes, even their knowledge.36
Obviously, allowing one litigant to represent another creates the
opportunity for the representative to take advantage of the absentee. A
simple example would be a sellout: the class representative, sometimes
called the named plaintiff, might be willing to “sell” the class’s claims
cheaply in a settlement so long as the defendant compensates the named
plaintiff, or possibly the named plaintiff’s attorney, at a premium.37 To
prevent sellouts and similar problems, would-be class representatives need
judicial permission to litigate on a class’s behalf.38
First, an individual plaintiff will file a complaint that identifies the
case as a putative class action. Then, the plaintiff will ask the court to
“certify” the class.39 Certification is permission. By moving for
certification, the would-be representative is asking the judge for permission
to represent the class. In federal courts, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure determines who gets that permission and who does not.40

35

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all members . . . .”).
36
In class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), notice to the absent class members is not
required. Id. 23(c)(2)(A). For class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must provide to class
members the “best notice that is practicable under the circumstances.” Id. 23(c)(2)(B). Accordingly,
absent class members may be unaware that their rights are being adjudicated.
37
See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 685, 728
(2005) (discussing reverse auctions).
38
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (“At an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a
class representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action.”).
39
Id.
40
See id. 23.
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B. Class Certification
Two aspects of class certification are important here: its legal
requirements—the
certification
requirements—and
its
practical
significance. If certification is permission, then certification’s significance
flows from what the representative is permitted to do once certified.
1. The Certification Requirements.—Rule 23 contains the
requirements for class certification in federal court.41 To be certified, a
putative class must meet all four Rule 23(a) requirements and the
requirements of at least one of the four types of class actions laid out in
Rule 23(b).42 Generally, the requirements are meant to ensure two things:
that the class representative will adequately protect the interests of the
absent class members43 and that the case will “work” as a class action.44
By “work” I mean two things. First, it means that the class
representative will, by proving her own claim, at the same time be proving
the claims of the absent class members. Second, it means that the case must
be one of a type that the rule deems appropriate for class treatment. After
all, “[t]he class action is ‘an exception to the usual rule that litigation is
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’”45 The
exception only applies, per Rule 23, to four types of cases.46
2. Class Certification’s Significance.—Class certification is central
to class litigation because of its legal and practical significance.47 The legal
significance of certification is that absent members of a certified class are
bound to the result of the litigation.48 If the class is not certified, or
decertified before a final judgment is entered, then the litigation has no

41

See id. 23(a), (b).
Id. The four types are generally referred to by their numbers: 23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2), and
(b)(3). Id. 23(b).
43
See id. 23(a)(4) (“[T]he representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.”).
44
See id. 23(b)(3) (instructing judges to consider whether the class action is “superior to other
available methods” for deciding the case, including whether there are “likely difficulties in managing a
class action”).
45
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki,
442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979)).
46
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
47
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class
Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2002) (“Courts are well aware that the decision to certify
or not radically alters the incentive structure of litigation, as reflected in the creation of the interlocutory
appeal mechanisms of Rule 23(f).”).
48
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(vii) (directing courts to give notice to classes certified under
Rule 23(b)(3) of “the binding effect of a class judgment on members”); see generally Smith v. Bayer
Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2380 (2011) (“Neither a proposed class action nor a rejected class action may
bind nonparties. What does have this effect is a class action approved under Rule 23.”).
42
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binding effect on their rights.49 An interesting consequence of this, recently
confirmed by the Supreme Court, is that members of a putative class that is
denied certification by one court can bring the same case and seek class
certification in another court.50
The practical significance of class certification is a product of its legal
significance. Certification gives the class representative permission to try
or settle the absent class members’ claims.51 Prior to class certification, the
class representative is a representative in name only; nothing she does
affects the rights of the absent class members.52 This has enormous
strategic consequences. As Judge Easterbrook concretely put it,
certification transforms $200,000 cases into $200,000,000 cases.53
Certification is the difference between a nuisance and a “bet the company”
case.54
On the other hand, if the judge denies class certification, that often
means the end of the case.55 The individual claims of the class
representative may not be worth enough to justify paying a lawyer to
pursue them. Cases like this are often abandoned if class certification is
denied.56 So class certification has big stakes for both sides. If the plaintiff
wins, the defendant may risk liabilities in excess of its assets. If the
49

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2); see generally Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2379–81 (finding that class
certification is a “precondition” for binding class members to suit outcome).
50
Bayer Corporation effectively overruled In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Products
Liability Litigation, 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2003), which had held that a denial of certification was
binding on the class members. Bayer Corporation acknowledged the policy behind the Bridgestone
decision: there is “an asymmetric system in which class counsel can win but never lose” because they
can relitigate certification. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2381 (quoting Bridgestone, 333 F.3d at 767)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
51
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. This permission is subject to Rule 23(e), which requires court approval
for class settlements. Id. 23(e) (“The claims . . . of a certified class may be settled . . . only with the
court’s approval.”).
52
Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2380 (“Neither a proposed class action nor a rejected class action may
bind nonparties.”).
53
Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001).
54
In addition to Szabo, id., these cases refer to class actions as “bet the company” or “bet-yourcompany” cases: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011); Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Mass., Inc. v. BCS Ins. Co., 671 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 2011); Creative Montessori Learning
Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F.3d 913, 915 (7th Cir. 2011); Stillmock v. Weis Mkts., Inc., 385 F.
App’x 267, 279 (4th Cir. 2010); Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009);
Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 2008); In re Visa
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 152 (2d Cir. 2001) (Jacobs, J., dissenting). This list
is by no means exhaustive, and represents only the past ten years or so of appellate cases.
55
See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469–70 (1978) (“[W]ithout the incentive of a
possible group recovery the individual plaintiff may find it economically imprudent to pursue his
lawsuit to a final judgment . . . .”).
56
See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 904–06 (1987) (breaking
class actions into three categories based on marketability of individual claims).
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defendant wins, the plaintiff may be forced to give up her case without a
determination on the merits.
I would like to emphasize the significance of these stakes by
introducing the reader to the debate about just how high they are. As I
noted in the Introduction, many prominent legal thinkers believe that class
actions, and specifically class certification, amount to legalized blackmail.57
For ease of reference, I will call this group “the blackmail camp.”
There are many familiar and influential names in the blackmail camp.
Justice Scalia58 and Judges Friendly,59 Easterbook,60 and Posner61 have used
and continue to use words like “blackmail” to describe the pressure
defendants feel when facing the risk of class-wide liability. Justice Scalia’s
recent opinion in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion contains language
typical of the group: “Faced with even a small chance of a devastating loss,
defendants will be pressured into settling questionable claims.”62 So
influential is the blackmail camp that they have turned class-certificationas-blackmail into an argument against class certification itself.63 And the
Advisory Committee’s Notes to Rule 23(f), which provide an exception to
the final judgment rule and give parties a conditional right to appeal a
denial or grant of class certification, treat the threat of blackmail in favor of
allowing an appeal.64
57

See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 119–20 (1973)
(calling class action settlements that defendants agree to because of a probability of a huge class
judgment “blackmail settlements”); Simon, supra note 12, at 375 (equating class actions in antitrust and
securities cases with “legalized blackmail” (quoting Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to
Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail,
78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1357, 1360–61 (2003) (“Judges Friendly, Posner, and Easterbrook are towering
figures in American jurisprudence and cannot be dismissed as ideologues.”).
58
See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752 (Scalia, J.) (“Faced with even a small chance of a devastating
loss, defendants will be pressured into settling questionable claims.”).
59
See FRIENDLY, supra note 57, at 120 (calling class action settlements that defendants agree to
because of a small probability of a huge class judgment “blackmail settlements”).
60
See Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Such
a claim puts a bet-your-company decision to Bridgeport’s managers and may induce a substantial
settlement even if the customers’ position is weak.”).
61
See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (“Judge
Friendly, who was not given to hyperbole, called settlements induced by a small probability of an
immense judgment in a class action ‘blackmail settlements.’ Judicial concern about them is
legitimate . . . .” (citation omitted)).
62
See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752.
63
See Silver, supra note 57, at 1358 (“‘Hydraulic pressure . . . to settle’ is now a recognized
objection to class certification.” (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259
F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2001))).
64
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1998) (“An order granting certification, on the
other hand, may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and
run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.”); see also Szabo, 249 F.3d at 675 (granting interlocutory
appeal under 23(f) because of settlement pressure).
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The blackmail camp has ensconced its thesis in the case law and in the
class action rule itself. But its opponents deride it as a myth.65 The
opponents have a variety of arguments, among them that there is no
empirical verification for the blackmail claim.66 Primarily, the opponents
contend that (1) if the settled cases were truly meritless then the defendant
would file a dispositive motion rather than settle and67 (2) so long as the
cases are not meritless, there is nothing normatively wrong about
pressuring defendants to settle.68
For my purposes, it is what the opponents do not say that is most
important. The opponents of the blackmail camp do not argue that class
certification exerts no or minimal pressure on defendants to settle. On the
existence of pressure, many agree with the blackmail camp—the pressure is
there, and it is enormous. Likewise, there appears to be no disagreement
that the pressure itself is based on the size of the potential liability.69 That is
significant because it makes jury certification a viable strategy.
All agree that the risk of class-wide liability pressures the defendant to
settle. And, as I mentioned in the Introduction, that is exactly the kind of
pressure that jury certification or, as we will see, the possibility of jury
certification can bring to bear.
C. The Overlap Interpretation
This section discusses the overlap interpretation. What I call the
overlap interpretation is the view—now prevailing in the federal courts—
that when plaintiffs bring class actions alleging certain causes of action,
one or another of Rule 23’s class certification requirements “overlaps” with
an element of that cause of action. Therefore, the plaintiff must prove that
element to obtain certification. Then, assuming the judge certifies the class,
the plaintiff must prove the element again at trial, because the judge’s
finding of whether the overlapped element is met for certification purposes
is not binding on the jury.70

65

Note the title: Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Exploding the Blackmail Myth: A New Perspective
on Class Action Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 681 (2005).
66
See id. at 697 (describing the similarity in rates of settlement for certified class actions and
conventional lawsuits and concluding that “the Blackmail Myth quite simply does not comport with
reality”).
67
See Kanner & Nagy, supra note 65, at 696.
68
See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[I]f their fears are truly
justified, the defendants can blame no one but themselves.”).
69
But see Kanner & Nagy, supra note 65, at 696–97.
70
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 n.6 (2011) (“[The overlapped issue is]
an issue they will surely have to prove again at trial in order to make out their case on the merits.”);
Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004).
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The overlap interpretation shows up routinely in two types of class
actions71: federal employment discrimination class actions72 and federal
securities fraud class actions.73 In securities fraud cases the overlap is often
between the “efficient market” requirement and predominance.74
Predominance comes from Rule 23(b)(3).75 It is shorthand for saying that
“questions of law or fact common to the class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members.”76 The predominance
requirement ensures that the class action will consume less judicial time
than individual actions.77 The existence of an efficient market for the
security at issue in the case is also a prerequisite to proving an element of
the plaintiff’s case for liability.78 That element is reliance: securities fraud
plaintiffs need to prove reliance,79 sometimes called transaction causation.80
If the plaintiff proves an efficient market, the plaintiff almost certainly
will obtain the so-called fraud-on-the-market presumption.81 This is a
71

Breach of warranty class actions are another type of class action where overlap occurs. See
Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2001) (describing overlap in breach of
warranty class action).
72
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2546–47 (reversing certification of plaintiff class in
employment discrimination class action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006)). It is also worth noting that the conditions for jury certification
probably arise more often in securities litigation than in employment discrimination. This is because,
based on my review of cases, it often appears that certification is denied in employment discrimination
on more than just the overlapped requirement. And jury certification is only possible where only the
overlapped requirement is the grounds for denial. See infra Part II.A.1.
73
See, e.g., Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2183, 2187 (2011)
(vacating denial of class certification for class brought under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 and remanding for further proceedings).
74
See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 26, 41–43 (2d Cir. 2006); Gariety,
368 F.3d at 366.
75
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: . . . the
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members . . . .”).
76
Id.
77
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966) (“It is only where this predominance
exists that economies can be achieved by means of the class-action device.”).
78
See Erica, 131 S. Ct. at 2185 (“It is undisputed that securities fraud plaintiffs must prove certain
things in order to invoke Basic’s rebuttable presumption of reliance. It is common ground, for example,
that plaintiffs must demonstrate . . . that the stock traded in an efficient market . . . .” (citing Basic, Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27 (1988) (plurality opinion))); see also Jeffrey L. Oldham, Comment,
Taking “Efficient Markets” Out of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine After the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995 (2003) (arguing that an efficient market is not the
appropriate prerequisite to application of the theory); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, supra
note 9 (discussing the theory and its application in securities litigation).
79
Erica, 131 S. Ct. at 2184.
80
NAGY ET AL., supra note 2, at 149 (“[R]eliance (also known as transaction causation) . . . .”).
81
See Erica, 131 S. Ct. at 2184–85 (“It is undisputed that securities fraud plaintiffs must prove
certain things in order to invoke Basic’s rebuttable presumption of reliance. It is common ground, for
example, that plaintiffs must demonstrate . . . that the stock traded in an efficient market . . . .” (citing
Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.27 (plurality opinion))).
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presumption of reliance.82 All fraud plaintiffs (i.e., whether alleging
securities or some other type of fraud) must show reliance: that they acted
in reliance on the defendant’s alleged misstatement.83 Reliance is an
individual question and therefore usually destroys predominance and, with
it, any hope of certification.84 If every member of the class had to show
individual reliance, then common questions wouldn’t predominate, and no
class could be certified.85 But the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
reliance replaces individual reliance based on the idea that, in an efficient
market, the market incorporates all public information, including the
defendant’s misstatements, into the price of a security.86 Thus, anyone who
bought at the market price relied on the misstatements simply by buying at
the market price.87 To obtain the presumption and, with it, predominance
and class certification, a plaintiff must prove the presumption’s
prerequisite: that the market for the security is efficient.88
1. Criticisms of the Overlap Interpretation.—Not everyone agrees
that the overlap interpretation is correct.89 And some have argued that,
correct or not, it causes significant problems.90 A main complaint is cost.91
If a plaintiff must prove an element of its case to get certification, it must
have discovery, causing delay and expense.92 For example, the Wal-Mart
case took almost two years from the complaint until the plaintiffs filed their
class certification motion.93 During that time, the parties exchanged more
than a million pages of documents and took more than 200 depositions.94

82

Id.
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 (plurality opinion) (“[R]eliance is and long has been an element of
common-law fraud . . . .”).
84
Id. at 242 (“Requiring proof of individualized reliance from each member of the proposed
plaintiff class effectively would have prevented respondents from proceeding with a class action, since
individual issues then would have overwhelmed the common ones.”).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 247 (“An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance
on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in market price,
an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for
purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.”).
87
See id.
88
See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011).
89
See, e.g., Olson, supra note 34, at 937–38.
90
Id. at 935.
91
Id. at 966 (discussing how a merits inquiry at certification can create expense and burden for the
parties and court, using Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001), as an example).
92
Id.
93
Complaint, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C01-02253)
(filed June 8, 2001); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222
F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C01-02253) (filed Apr. 28, 2003).
94
Brief for Respondents at 10–11, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10277), 2011 WL 686407, at *10–11 (“After extensive discovery, including over 200 depositions,
83
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The claim that the overlap interpretation is incorrect rests on Rule 23’s
text. Both the commonality and predominance requirements demand
“common questions.”95 Whether a pattern or practice exists or whether the
market for a particular security is efficient are both questions. And they are
common to all the class members in any discrimination or securities class
action. Textually, commonality and predominance are satisfied so long as
the plaintiffs allege them. The answer to the common question—yes, the
market is efficient; no, there is no pattern or practice—is therefore
irrelevant to certification. In other words, the overlap interpretation
demands common answers, not common questions, and is therefore a faulty
reading of the rule. In other words, the only way to square the overlap
interpretation with the rule’s text is to say that if the answer to a common
question is “no,” then the rule treats the question as if it doesn’t exist.
This criticism hasn’t been well addressed. One illustration comes from
a securities fraud class action filed in the Middle District of Louisiana. The
trial judge rejected the overlap interpretation and granted certification.96
The judge called two decisions applying the overlap interpretation
“troubling,” adding that “whether the putative plaintiffs in this proposed
class are entitled to the Basic presumption of reliance based on market
efficiency is clearly a common question of law and fact that applies to each
individual class member.”97 The trial judge ruled that predominance was
satisfied so long as the plaintiff alleged an efficient market.98 The Fifth
Circuit reversed, adopting the overlap interpretation.99 It is telling, I think,
that the Fifth Circuit did not answer the lower court’s questions about the
overlap interpretation.
Several scholars have suggested that concern for defendants has led
judges to ignore the textual flaws with the overlap interpretation: “It
appears that one reason courts are scrutinizing the merits more closely may
have to do with a concern about improper settlement leverage, and in
particular the risk that certification might pressure unjustified settlements in
frivolous and weak class action suits.”100 Whatever may be behind the
overlap interpretation’s acceptance, its proponents have yet to offer a
convincing defense of its logic.

production of more than a million pages of documents, and electronic personnel data, plaintiffs
assembled a massive record to support class certification.”).
95
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), (b)(3).
96
See Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., No. 01-703, 2003 WL 25739165, at *7 (M.D. La. Aug. 1, 2003),
vacated, 401 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[A]ny doubts as to the merits of Plaintiffs’ case are not a reason
to deny class certification.”).
97
Id. at *6.
98
See id. at *7.
99
Unger, 401 F.3d at 324–25.
100
Robert G. Bone, Sorting Through the Certification Muddle, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 105,
109–10 (2010).
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D. The Preponderance Standard
Rule 23 clearly says what the certification requirements are but does
not instruct the judge to use any particular standard to decide when they
have been met.101 It is interesting that even though the relevant text of Rule
23 has not changed,102 judges have progressed over the past four decades
from granting certification based on the allegations in the plaintiff’s
complaint to requiring that the plaintiff demonstrate compliance with each
element by a preponderance of the evidence.103 Preponderance is now the
consensus in the federal courts.104
The move to preponderance is significant to jury certification. It is
important that the certification standard is no higher—i.e., not clear and
convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt—than the standard used
in civil jury trials. If the certification standard were higher, then the jury’s
finding might not properly be able to substitute for that of the judge.
Because both the judge and the jury are deciding the same fact (whether the
security trades on an efficient market) on the same standard
(preponderance), jury certification is possible.
II. THE INS AND OUTS OF JURY CERTIFICATION
This Part has two sections. Section A explains jury certification stepby-step. Section B raises possible defenses to jury certification. Some of
these defenses may defeat jury certification in a particular case, but none
rob it of its viability or reveal it to be fundamentally unsound.
A. Jury Certification: Step-by-Step
In this section, I will identify what needs to happen during the
progress of a lawsuit for jury certification to work. To present this
information, I have broken this section into seven subsections: the denial of

101

The entire rule and the advisory committee notes are silent.
The text of Rules 23(a) and 23(b) has not been substantially amended since 1966. In 1966,
commonality under Rule 23(a) required “questions of law or fact common to the class,” exactly as it
does now. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (1966). Likewise, the 1966 version of Rule 23(b)(3) is very
similar—and identical in meaning—to the current version. In 1966, the rule required that “questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members.” Id. 23(b)(3) (1966). Now, it reads “questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” Id. 23(b)(3).
103
Compare Richerson v. Fargo, 61 F.R.D. 641, 642 (E.D. Pa. 1974), vacated 64 F.R.D. 393 (E.D.
Pa. 1974) (“[T]he weight of authority has held that in such cases where a pattern of discrimination is
alleged, the common questions of law and fact predominate.” (emphasis added)), with Meyer v.
Macmillan Publ’g Co., 95 F.R.D. 411, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“We conclude that plaintiffs have
provided sufficient evidence of the existence of a class as to whom there are common questions of law
and fact.” (emphasis added)).
104
See, e.g., Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 190 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Plaintiffs bear the
burden of establishing each element of Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
102
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certification, giving notice, getting to the jury, possible settlement, winning
at trial, the two paths to jury certification, and a summary.
1. The Denial of Certification.—Obviously, if the judge grants the
plaintiff’s motion for class certification, then there is no need for jury
certification. If, however, certification is denied, jury certification will not
always be possible. Rather, the judge must deny certification in a specific
way. Namely, the judge must find that all the certification requirements are
satisfied except for the overlapped requirement: predominance. Further, the
judge must conclude that the only reason that predominance is not satisfied
is because the plaintiff failed to prove market efficiency. The judge must
decide in favor of the plaintiff on all the other certification requirements
because the jury cannot reach them. As it turns out, securities fraud class
actions are routinely denied class certification solely on the basis of the
plaintiff’s inability to prove market efficiency.105 Accordingly, securities
class action attorneys have opportunities to try jury certification.
2. Giving Notice.—Following the judge’s denial of certification, the
plaintiff should give notice to the defendant of two things: that she will ask
for certification again after trial and that she will attempt to prove market
efficiency at trial. This means that the plaintiff must, in her individual trial,
prove reliance by invoking the fraud-on-the-market presumption, the same
as she would if she were officially representing the class. This amounts to
telling the defendant that the trial will be a rematch of the parties’
certification arguments and evidence on market efficiency.
Without notice, the defendant might not realize the full stakes of the
litigation. A defendant who is aware of the possibility of jury certification
may litigate more aggressively than one who isn’t. The latter defendant
might, when jury certification comes up—as I’ll discuss briefly—claim to
be unfairly prejudiced. And that prejudice can weigh against jury
certification in either its Rule 23(c) or collateral-estoppel forms. But, if the
plaintiff tells the defendant what the true stakes of the litigation are, then
any lack of aggression is the result of the defendant’s informed choice, and
not a source of unfair prejudice.
3. Getting to the Jury.—At this point, after certification has been
denied and notice given, the case may be ripe for settlement. A defendant
who has no confidence in her ability to win summary judgment is in almost
the same position at this point as she would have been had the class been
certified. That is, the defendant must choose whether to settle now or risk
liability to the class at trial. As both sides of the blackmail debate agree,
this pressure has the capacity to induce settlement.106

105
106

See supra note 14.
See supra notes 53–64.
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If, on the other hand, the defendant has a plausible summary
judgment107 argument, then the defendant will be less inclined to settle. In
the situation I’ve just described the defendant will likely have just such an
argument: that the market is not efficient. After all, the judge in my
hypothetical has just denied class certification, using a preponderance
standard, on the very ground that the market was not efficient. Any
reasonable defendant, having received notice that the plaintiff will attempt
jury certification, will try to build on their momentum and file a summary
judgment motion attacking market efficiency. The judge’s certification
finding is not binding on the jury.108 Summary judgment, of course, would
be. So to keep the hope of jury certification alive, the plaintiff must avoid
summary judgment on market efficiency.
The plaintiff can do this by focusing on the difference in the standards
used on certification and summary judgment. Certification uses
preponderance;109 summary judgment, the “reasonable juror” standard.110
Summary judgment should only be granted when there is “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”111 A dispute is “genuine” only if reasonable jurors could
disagree about its outcome.112 And since the standard that jurors employ in
a civil case is, like in certification, one of preponderance, this means that if
no reasonable juror could find by a preponderance of the evidence for one
of the parties on a particular issue, then there is no genuine dispute as to
that issue, and summary judgment should be granted.113
Preponderance is a higher standard than the reasonable juror standard.
The plaintiff seeking jury certification must oppose summary judgment by
convincing the judge that, although the plaintiff failed to show market
efficiency by a preponderance at the certification stage, her evidence is
sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to find market efficiency by a
preponderance. In other words, the plaintiff’s task is to convince the judge
that a reasonable juror could disagree with her about market efficiency.
107

I ignore judgment as a matter of law for two reasons. First, it is based on the same standard as
summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (“Petitioners suggest,
and we agree, that this standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict . . . .”). Thus, the defendant’s
estimate of his chances of success is not likely to differ between the two motions. And second, as far as
jury certification is concerned, the effect of summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law is the
same: if the defendant wins, jury certification does not work.
108
Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The jury or factfinder can
be given free hand to find all of the facts required to render a verdict on the merits, and if its finding on
any fact differs from a finding made in connection with class action certification, the ultimate
factfinder’s finding on the merits will govern the judgment.”).
109
See supra Part I.D.
110
See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
111
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
112
See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
113
Id.
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Whether this task is doable is highly contextual. It will depend on
specific facts and case law. But there is reason to believe that the space
between preponderance and the reasonable juror standard is large enough
to give plaintiffs a reasonable chance of success. This is because the verbal
formulation of the reasonable juror standard, which makes it sound very
close to a preponderance, does not reflect the deference many judges show
to juries in practice.114 Accordingly, even though there may not seem to be
much room between a preponderance (full stop) and what reasonable
people could deem a preponderance, in practice, judges are willing to let
the word “reasonable” do a lot of work. Moreover, the plaintiff will have
the benefit of the judge’s certification opinion, which will likely identify
where the judge thought the plaintiff’s evidence was lacking. A savvy
plaintiff might revise her presentation or seek additional evidence to
address these concerns in preparation for opposing a summary judgment
motion.
4. Possible Settlement.—Assuming the judge denies summary
judgment, or the defendant does not wish to risk injuring its bargaining
position by moving for summary judgment and losing, then the defendant
may settle. This presents an unresolved issue of law. While it is not unusual
for judges to certify classes for settlement purposes,115 there are no reported
cases of a judge doing so immediately after denying certification, as would
happen here. The question is therefore whether the defendant’s newfound
willingness to concede certification trumps the judge’s prior determination
that certification was inappropriate. There are several reasons to believe it
should.
First, Rule 23 allows judges to amend or alter denials of certification
prior to final judgment.116 There is, therefore, no question of authority.
Second, it’s the defendant’s funeral. The judge has no remaining
institutional interest in protecting the denial of certification for its own
sake;117 doing so only delays the litigation’s resolution. Third, there is no
prejudice to absent class members. Their interests are independently
protected by the requirement that the judge approve the settlement’s
terms.118 Fourth, it is well recognized in overlap classes that the judge’s
114

See Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the
Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1334 (2005).
115
See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, § 1797.2 (collecting cases).
116
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C).
117
A judge might refuse certification, even where the parties agree to it, to protect the interests of
the absent class members. In the case of a certification for settlement purposes, Rule 23 instructs judges
to consider whether those interests were adequately served under the Rule 23(a)(4) requirement of
adequacy. See id. 23(e)(2). Here, that requirement was, by hypothesis, found to have been satisfied
when the judge denied certification (recall that for jury certification to work, the judge must find all the
other requirements satisfied, so we assume here that she did).
118
See id. 23(e).
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decision on the overlapped element is not final.119 It has always been a
possibility that the jury would disagree with the judge at trial when
deciding the case’s merits. Here, that disagreement merely comes from
another source—the defendant—and a little bit sooner than might
otherwise be expected.
Finally, it seems unlikely that, in the absence of some legal directive
or prejudice, a judge is likely to fight too hard against parties that wish to
settle. There is an acknowledged judicial policy in favor of settlement.120
Settlement saves time and resources, both the parties’ and the court’s.
Where, as here, the alternative means continued complicated litigation, it
seems unlikely that the judge would turn a willing defendant away.
5. Winning the Trial.—Assuming the case neither settles nor ends at
summary judgment, the plaintiff must, of course, win the trial to keep the
possibility of jury certification alive. Specifically, the plaintiff must win in
a way that makes it clear that the jury decided the overlapped element—
market efficiency—in its favor.121 When the overlapped element is a
necessary element of the plaintiff’s claim this takes care of itself. But, if the
plaintiff presented alternative theories—individual reliance and the fraudon-the-market presumption—then the plaintiff must use Rule 49(b).122
Rule 49(b) allows the jury to enter a general verdict—i.e., the plaintiff
wins, or the defendant wins—but also requires it to respond to individual
fact questions.123 In this case, the plaintiff will want to include as a fact
question the overlapped element: was the relevant market efficient during
the relevant time period?124 If only a general verdict is returned or the
119

See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 n.6 (2011) (“[The overlapped issue
is] an issue they will surely have to prove again at trial in order to make out their case on the merits.”);
Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 152–53, 60 (1982) (remanding with instructions to decertify the
class following a post-trial appeal of class judgment).
120
In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 689 F. Supp. 2d 297, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“There is a
‘strong judicial policy in favor of settlements, particularly in the class action context.’” (quoting
McReynolds v. Richards-Cantave, 588 F.3d 790, 803 (2d Cir. 2009))).
121
Otherwise, collateral estoppel will not work. For a judgment to collaterally estop relitigation of
a fact in a later case, the determination of that exact same fact must have been necessary to the
judgment in a prior case. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) (“When an
issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the
determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action
between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”).
122
FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b).
123
See id.
124
In particular, the plaintiff will want to make sure the question encompasses the scope—in time
and place—of the class’s claims, i.e., not just “Did the defendant operate under a pattern or practice of
discrimination?” but “Did the defendant operate under a pattern or practice of discrimination at its
Austin, Texas facilities between June 2010 and January 2012?” Collateral estoppel can be defeated if
the issue decided in the prior litigation is not the exact same issue to be determined. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). Accordingly, care is necessary to draft the jury question. For the
same reason, if the plaintiff is relying on a general verdict, then the plaintiff’s claim should
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question is answered in the negative, then there is no basis to conclude that
the jury actually decided the overlapped element, and neither path to jury
certification will work.
Unfortunately, parties have no right to demand that questions be
submitted under Rule 49(b).125 In practice, the decision to submit a question
to the jury rests in the absolute discretion of the trial court.126 Accordingly,
there is an element of risk here that would be minimized by proceeding
under a single theory—i.e., trying to prove reliance with the fraud-on-themarket presumption alone. Plaintiffs who want to use the presumption and
individual reliance will want to emphasize their trial strategy with the judge
early and often, so that, when the Rule 49(b) request comes, the judge
understands its importance.127
6. Three Paths to Jury Certification.—If the jury returns a verdict
that necessarily includes a finding in favor of the plaintiff on market
efficiency, then jury certification remains viable under either of two
approaches. The first is to make a motion to amend the order denying
certification. The second is to allow the case to proceed to final judgment
and then use that judgment as collateral estoppel in a second, identical class
action. A variation on this second option—what I called the “third path” in
the Introduction—is to skip the motion for certification in the first case,
litigating the whole case as an individual securities fraud action and relying
on the fraud-on-the-market theory for reliance.
a. An amendment motion.—A motion to amend the order
denying certification raises three sets of issues: the judge’s authority to
grant the motion, the motion’s merits, and the judge’s discretion to grant or
deny the motion independent of its merits.
Rule 23(c)(1)(C) authorizes judges to “alter[] or amend[]” an order
which “denies” certification until final judgment is entered.128 Accordingly,
so long as the motion is made between the return of the verdict and final
judgment, the rule appears to authorize the motion. Judges, in fact, often

encompass—in time, place, etc.—the class’s claims. For this reason, it may be necessary to try two or
more individual cases so that the judgment necessarily encompasses the full scope of the class’s claims.
125
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b) (“The court may submit to the jury forms for a general verdict,
together with written questions on one or more issues of fact . . . .” (emphasis added)).
126
9B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2505 (3d ed. 2008) (“Although, as noted earlier in the discussion, there are frequent judicial
statements in the reported cases that the district court’s decision whether or not to use a special verdict
under Rule 49(a) is reviewable by the court of appeals only for abuse of discretion, there appears never
to have been a reversal on this ground.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
127
Judges have almost unreviewable discretion to allow special questions to be put to the jury.
Accordingly, it is important that the judge understand why the questions are significant.
128
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C).
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entertain post-trial motions to amend certification orders.129 The most
common of these is likely the motion to decertify, but at least one judge has
amended an order to expand the class definition, thereby adding class
members after trial.130 A strong argument in favor of approving the motion
is that the rule’s text offers no reason to treat a motion to amend that
reverses a denial of certification differently from one that reverses a grant;
if judges routinely do one—and they do131—then the other is not
problematic simply for being less common.
The merits of a motion to amend raise two issues. The first is whether,
setting aside the overlapped element, anything else has changed in the
certification calculus. Sometimes, trial reveals facts to the judge that, while
not bearing on the merits of the dispute, give rise to grounds for
decertification132 (thus, the post-trial decertification motions mentioned in
the last paragraph). If nothing like that arises, then the second issue is
whether the judge will choose to credit the jury’s finding on market
efficiency over her own prior finding. If the judge credits the jury, then she
should grant the motion and certify the class.133
There is, however, no case law or rule that compels the judge to
abandon her prior finding in favor of the jury’s. But even though the
motion to amend cannot force the judge to accept the jury’s finding, there
are three reasons to expect that the judge, nonetheless, will. First, the jury
made its decision based on a more developed presentation. Although
discovery was perhaps complete when the certification decision was
made,134 regardless, the jury would have benefitted from live testimony
rather than paper, as well as from any changes the parties made to their
arguments in response to the judge’s certification finding. It is reasonable
to expect, after all, that the lawyers on both sides will have developed their
arguments between certification and trial. (Who knows? Maybe the second
presentation of the issue will secretly change the judge’s mind too.)
The next two reasons are related. The first is that it might be unseemly
for a judge to disagree with a jury verdict immediately following that
129

See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19 (“Courts have modified or decertified classes at . . . the
completion of the trial on the merits.”).
130
Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 877–78 (11th Cir. 1986) (permitting a post-trial
expansion of the class).
131
See, e.g., Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 811 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The district court
may decertify a class after trial . . . .”).
132
See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19 (“[T]he action always can be decertified or the class
description altered if later events suggest that it is appropriate to do so.”).
133
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee’s note (2003) (“A court that is not satisfied that
the requirements of Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until they have been met.”). This
statement implies that, once the court is satisfied that the requirements have been met, there is no reason
not to certify.
134
See Olson, supra note 34, at 954–56 (indicating that judges will allow plaintiffs to take merits
discovery prior to class certification in overlap cases).
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verdict. The judge does not have to accept the jury’s verdict on the
overlapped element in the motion to amend context, but that verdict will no
doubt control the liability of the defendant. If the judge were to accept the
finding for liability’s sake but refuse to acknowledge it on the motion to
amend, it would send an unflattering message about the judge’s estimation
of the jury, detracting from the perceived legitimacy of the civil justice
system, generally, and the civil jury, specifically.
One complicating factor, which is the third reason that the judge may
choose to acknowledge the jury’s finding, is the Seventh Amendment’s
right to jury trial.135 Seventh Amendment jurisprudence is notoriously
convoluted.136 The Seventh Amendment surely doesn’t force the judge to
accept the jury’s finding, but the judge doing so would not be out of line
with what courts have said about the overlap interpretation—namely, that
the judge’s finding cannot bind the jury137—or with the charge leveled at
the overlap interpretation by critics that it interferes with the plaintiff’s
Seventh Amendment rights.138 Acquiescing in the jury’s opinion avoids the
issue entirely.
The final issue raised by the motion to amend is the judge’s discretion.
Even if the judge accepts the motion on the merits and acknowledges her
authority to grant it, she does not have to. Motions under Rule 23(c)(1)(C)
are discretionary.139 In other post-trial motions under 23(c)(1)(C), discretion
has been tied to prejudice, which has been tied to notice. Obviously,
granting the motion does not prejudice the plaintiff or the absent class
members. But it might unfairly prejudice a defendant if that defendant had
been unaware that the trial was really a class trial in disguise. A reasonable
defendant would be unlikely to expend the same amount of effort and
resources on an individual case as on a class case. Accordingly, informing
the defendant of the true stakes of the case is key to affording her a full and
fair opportunity to litigate. This is why I suggest giving notice above.
b. A second class action.—All is not lost if the judge denies the
motion to amend or if the plaintiff prefers not to file that motion. The
alternative is to proceed to final judgment in the individual case and then
135

U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of
Rational Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486, 486–87 (1975) (describing the difficulty and
confusion in Seventh Amendment analysis).
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Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The jury or factfinder can
be given free hand to find all of the facts required to render a verdict on the merits, and if its finding on
any fact differs from a finding made in connection with class action certification, the ultimate
factfinder’s finding on the merits will govern the judgment.”).
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See Olson, supra note 34, at 938 (criticizing overlap interpretation as abridging the jury trial
right).
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7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19 (“However, it must be noted that there is no requirement
that the court alter its class-action order when the circumstances surrounding its initial determination
change. The decision to amend a class-certification order is discretionary.”).
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file an identical class action with a new named plaintiff. Then, the new
class should move for class certification and use collateral estoppel to
prevent the defendant from arguing that the market is efficient.140 Collateral
estoppel, generally, prevents a party from contesting an issue that was
determined against it in a prior case if it had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue (again, this requires notice of the stakes in the first case),
and it is clear that the judgment encompasses the issue (thus, the special
questions under Rule 49(b)).141
With the overlapped element established, the nonoverlapped
certification requirements remain. While the second judge is not required to
find these in the plaintiff’s favor, the first judge’s decision on this point
will be persuasive both on stare decisis and comity grounds.142 So,
presumably, the second judge will decide the remaining requirements in the
plaintiff’s favor, and therefore certify the class.
Depending on the specific facts of the case, collateral estoppel may
also be able to establish other elements of the class’s claims as well. This
advantage could be significant, as it would mean that the defendant
effectively begins the case with the class certified and, potentially,
summary judgment entered against it on liability. Rather than try to fight
with those disabilities, a reasonable defendant would probably settle.
c. Two cases: one motion for certification.—The collateral
estoppel option works even if the plaintiff never moves for class
certification in the first case. This is the third path. If the plaintiff takes an
individual case or a case with a few individual plaintiffs to trial and wins,
then that judgment can be used for collateral estoppel in a follow-up class
action in much the same manner as I describe above.
7. Summary.—One way to view jury certification is that, in the eyes
of the risk-averse defendant, it transforms a denial of certification into a
grant of certification whenever the defendant is less than confident that she
can use summary judgment to prevent a trial. Jury certification requires
only (1) a class action subject to the overlap interpretation,143 (2) a denial of
certification based solely on the overlapped element,144 and (3) notice to the
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See generally Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326–33 (1979) (describing use
of collateral estoppel in a securities case).
141
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) (“When an issue of fact or law is
actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the
judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the
same or a different claim.”).
142
See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2382 (2011) (“[W]e would expect federal courts to
apply principles of comity to each other’s class certification decisions when addressing a common
dispute.”).
143
See supra Part I.C.
144
See supra Part II.A.1.
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defendant.145 The steps required to obtain jury certification, although not
established with directly-on-point case law, are each, individually
considered, relatively slight variations on current practices.
Thus, the strategy is viable. And there are two additional
considerations that make it more so. First, it does not actually have to work
in the sense of getting the class certified post-trial to work in the sense of
producing a settlement. As long as it appears viable enough to the
defendant, it will induce risk-averse defendants to settle. Second, there is
little incremental cost and risk to the plaintiff (and her attorney) in
attempting jury certification. In overlap cases most of the discovery
necessary to try the case may well be concluded before the certification
motion is filed.146 That cost is sunk. And even though the cost of trying the
case will likely be substantial, this cost should be weighed against the
potential recovery for the entire class. Aside from cost, there is the lack of
risk to the absent class members’ claims to consider. If the plaintiff loses at
trial, only the individual plaintiff’s claim, now fairly adjudicated, is
extinguished. The class’s claims remain viable because the class was never
certified and therefore the adverse judgment against a member of the class
has no impact. Theoretically, the plaintiff’s attorney can continue to retry
the case until she runs out of representative plaintiffs.147
B. Defenses to Jury Certification
I will now consider some countermeasures that defendants might
employ if threatened with jury certification. In particular cases, some of
these options may prevent the case from ever becoming a certified class
action. In addition, the substantial amount of discretion that judges have at
various points on the path to jury certification may be exercised in the
defendant’s favor and to the same effect. Yet, neither these
countermeasures nor judicial discretion is a guaranteed shield. This is
significant, because jury certification retains its viability as a negotiating
chip so long as there is no surefire way to defeat it.
1. Summary Judgment.—One defensive option is to move for
summary judgment immediately after class certification is denied, targeting
the overlapped element.148 This allows the summary judgment motion to
145

See supra Part II.A.2.
See Olson, supra note 34 (indicating that judges will allow plaintiffs to take merits discovery
prior to class certification in overlap cases).
147
There may be practical limits—the availability of class representatives, finances, etc.—but it is
now clear that a decision not to certify a class does not bind the members of that would-be class. See
Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2382 (“[T]he mere proposal of a class in the federal action could not bind
persons who were not parties there.”).
148
Summary judgment in federal court is not limited to entire claims or defenses. It can be targeted
at specific facts or issues. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying
each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.”).
146
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build on the momentum of the denial of certification. The judge just
decided by a preponderance of the evidence that the market was not
efficient.149 She may, therefore, be willing to grant summary judgment if
the defendant can convince her that the plaintiff’s evidence of the
overlapped element fails to meet the “reasonable juror” standard, as well.150
2. Rule 68 Offers of Judgment.—Rule 68 allows a defendant to offer
judgment on specific terms to the plaintiff.151 If the plaintiff accepts, the
case is over. If the plaintiff declines the offer but ultimately recovers less
than what was offered, then the plaintiff must pay whatever costs were
incurred by the defendant from the date of the rejected offer forward.152
First, I will describe how a defendant might use Rule 68 to avoid jury
certification. Then, I will discuss the relative strengths and weaknesses of
Rule 68 as a countermeasure.
Rule 68 has been used in the class action context to “buy off” the
individual plaintiff.153 The buy-off moots the case, stripping the court of
subject matter jurisdiction and, thereby, preventing a class from ever being
certified.154 Timing is critical. In the circuits where this strategy is available,
the offer usually must come before the class certification motion is filed.155
Otherwise, the absent class members are said to have a “stake” in the case;
thus, mooting the individual plaintiff’s case will no longer moot the entire
case.156
It is unclear whether a buy-off would work after the plaintiff is denied
certification when that plaintiff intends to attempt jury certification. No
court has decided whether the absent class members retain a stake in
certification under these circumstances. If they do, then buy-off will not be
an effective countermeasure against jury certification. One reason to think
that the absent class members would retain a stake when the plaintiff
intends to seek jury certification is that denials of certification are
appealable157 and amendable.158 If the case can be mooted by a buy-off,
then, in effect, the appealability and amendability provisions of Rule 23 are
meaningless. Still, it is likely worth it for the defendant to argue that, once
class certification is denied, the case can be mooted with an offer to the
individual plaintiff, if for no other reason than that the point is unsettled.
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That said, there are two related problems that make the buy-off option
risky for defendants. First, it can be expensive. To moot the individual
plaintiff’s claim, the defendant will need to offer the entire value of that
claim and attorneys’ fees and costs.159 Since precertification discovery in
overlap class actions is apt to be expensive,160 this strategy is unlikely to be
cheap even if the individual plaintiff’s damages are low.
The related problem is determining what the correct buy-off amount
should be. The offer is invalid, meaning that it will not moot the case,
unless it represents the full value of the plaintiff’s claim.161 The cases where
buy-offs have been used successfully to date are ones involving fixed,
statutory damages. When damages are set, there is no difficulty calculating
the appropriate amount.162 In securities cases, calculating individual
damages for a correct buy-off amount is likely to be more difficult.163
A final note is that there is little, if any, risk that by offering judgment
the defendant will simply allow a different plaintiff to use the judgment to
certify a class in another case by collateral estoppel. Consent judgments, of
which Rule 68 offers a species, rarely support collateral estoppel.164
Typically, collateral estoppel is only allowed on consent judgments when
the judgment indicates that this was the parties’ intent.165
3. “One-Way” Intervention.—“One-way” intervention was a
problem associated with a version of Rule 23 that no longer exists.166 When
the rule was first adopted in 1938, there was a type of class action, called
the “spurious” class action, which had no binding effect on the rights of
absent class members unless and until the absentee intervened as a party.167
The problem was that, practically, this allowed absentees to wait until the
merits of the case were decided, and then intervene only if their side won.168
If their side lost, the absentee could just file an individual suit rather than
159
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See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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1488–89 (1996); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions,
66 MD. L. REV. 348, 349 (2007); Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to
Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883, 884 (1990).
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intervene because the class’s loss did not bind her. The rulemakers sought
to abolish one-way intervention in 1966. They eliminated the “spurious”
class action and encouraged judges to decide certification before deciding
the merits.169
Defendants might argue that jury certification is, in effect, one-way
intervention and, therefore, is impermissible. Admittedly, there is a
resemblance. In both jury certification and in one-way intervention, the
absent class members’ rights do not become subject to alteration until the
merits of their claims have already been decided in their favor.
There are three reasons to think that, in spite of this resemblance, the
one-way intervention argument will not defeat jury certification. The first is
textual. Rule 23 does not prohibit one-way intervention explicitly, but it
does explicitly allow a denial of certification to be modified after trial.170
This creates a tension because there is no way to modify a post-trial denial
of certification that does not, in some way, resemble one-way intervention.
To modify a denial, part of the denial must be revoked. This means that
either absent class members that were initially excluded from the class
definition must be let in, or claims that were not certified must now be
certified. Either way, the result resembles one-way intervention and is
clearly countenanced by the rule.
The second reason not to credit the one-way intervention argument is
precedent. Judges have already considered and rejected the “looks like
‘one-way’ intervention” argument in the context of amending class
definitions after trial.171 The final reason is practical. Even if one-way
intervention is held to preclude a motion to amend that reverses a denial of
certification, the same result can be achieved with nonmutual, offensive
collateral estoppel, as discussed above. This has practical and doctrinal
significance.
The practical significance is that collateral estoppel achieves the same
result but with more litigation and, therefore, higher cost. The doctrinal
significance is a little more complicated. When one-way intervention was
“abolished” in 1966, a plaintiff could not use collateral estoppel based on a
judgment to which she was not a party. This was an element of the doctrine
of mutuality.172 In its fullest form, the doctrine of mutuality meant that only
a party to a judgment could invoke that judgment for res judicata or
collateral estoppel.173 In other words, a jury certification/collateral estoppel
strategy would not have worked in 1966, whatever the merits of the “one169

Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C).
171
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way” intervention argument, because the plaintiff in the second class action
could not have used the prior judgment against the defendant since she was
not a party to the first case.
Today, mutuality is gone.174 Anyone can use a judgment against a
party to that judgment, whether the user was a party to it or not. Without
mutuality, prohibiting tactics that resemble “one-way” intervention is,
practically speaking, impossible—the second plaintiff can now achieve
through collateral estoppel what, before, would only have been possible
through intervention. Accordingly, the decisions that broke mutuality
should be taken as a judgment that the kind of unfairness sought to be
prohibited by stopping “one-way” intervention is no longer an overriding
systemic concern.
CONCLUSION
I would like to conclude by summarizing a key point, making a
suggestion, and noting an irony. The key point is for the plaintiff’s
securities fraud bar: whenever class certification is denied solely based on
market inefficiency, abandoning the case means leaving the class’s money
on the table. The main point of this Note has been to show that a denial of
certification, under certain circumstances, can put the defendant in the
same position as a grant of certification—forced to decide between settling
and risking class-wide liability at trial.
The suggestion I have is for judges and scholars concerned about class
actions and class certification. I have tried to avoid the normative here and
instead focused on what I feel is a viable but as-yet-untested application of
existing law. I am not, however, blind to the normative implications of jury
certification. My suggestion is that those looking to categorize jury
certification consider grouping it with the other recognized flaws of the
overlap interpretation. As I noted above, the overlap interpretation is
textually unjustifiable and costly for the parties. It is also what allows the
jury to certify. Juries are the masters of a case’s merits and only by
overlapping the merits with certification are juries given a say on
certification. Therefore, if jury certification is troubling, so too should be
the overlap interpretation.
Finally, I will note an irony. As I mentioned above, the overlap
interpretation—which allows for jury certification—is likely the product of
scholarly and judicial sympathy.175 That sympathy, in turn, is based on the
pressure that class action defendants feel to settle when faced with a
certified class.176 In other words, the overlap interpretation was meant to
174
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make class certification harder in order to protect defendants from having
to choose between settlement and the risk of class-wide liability at trial. To
the extent that observation is accurate, it is ironic that the overlap
interpretation has the potential to achieve the opposite result by opening the
door to jury certification.
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